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COMMENTARY 
 
WHEN CONSCIENCE ,61¶7&/($5: GREATER GLASGOW HEALTH 
BOARD v DOOGAN AND ANOTHER [2014] UKSC 68 
  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
ThH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V MXGJPHQW LQ Doogan is a judicial review of a decision by Greater 
Glasgow Health Board regarding the scope of the conscience-based exemption in section 4(1) 
of the Abortion Act 1967. The case progressed through the Outer and Inner Houses of the 
Court of Session in Edinburgh before final judgment was delivered in the Supreme Court by 
Baroness Hale on 17th December 2014. The Supreme Court eschewed consideration of the 
human rights dimension of the case (which had featured in the Outer House decision) and 
approached its judgment DV µD SXUH TXHVWLRQ RI VWDWXWRU\ FRQVWUXFWLRQ¶ 7KLV FRPPHQWDU\
engages with the judgment on its own terms, assessing it as an exercise in statutory 
interpretation, and leaves it to others who may wish to do so to comment on the human rights 
aspects of the case. 
 
 
BACKGROUND AND FACTS OF THE CASE 
 
Facts 
Mary Doogan and Connie Wood are experienced senior midwives who worked, at the time 
this dispute originated, in the Southern General Hospital (SGH) on the south side of Glasgow. 
Both women have always refused, for reasons of conscience, to participate in abortions. On 
commencing her employment, each woman had duly notified the employer that she wished to 
exercise her statutory right to be exempt from participation under section 4(1) of the Abortion 
Act 1967.  
The Health Board had found it possible IRUPDQ\\HDUVVLQFHLQ0DU\'RRJDQ¶V
case) WRDFFRPPRGDWHWKHZRPHQ¶VH[HUFLVHRItheir right, interpreted so as to exempt them 
from any involvement in the abortion process whatsoever. In the years leading up to the 
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dispute, however, maternity provision in Glasgow was reorganised. One of three hospitals 
providing maternity servicesWKH4XHHQ0RWKHU¶V0DWHUQLW\+RVSLWDO (QMH), was closed in 
2010, and the pattern of provision in the remaining two hospitals was reconfigured. Most 
importantly, upon the closure of the QMH, its Foetal Medicine unit was relocated to the 
SGH. Although some late term abortions for foetal abnormality had always been carried out 
on the labour ward of the SGH, they had hitherto represented a tiny proportion of its work. 
The organisational changes meant that the number of late-term abortions on the labour ward, 
and the proportion of its overall work which they represented, would be likely to increase. 
Miss Doogan and Mrs Wood were concerned that this might make it more difficult for them 
to avoid contact with the abortion process, and sought reassurance that their employer would 
continue to respect their right to be exempt from any involvement in it. In the internal 
procedure that followed, the employer insisted that, although the women could not be 
expected to have any direct involvement in abortion, they could be required to perform what 
FDPHWREHUHIHUUHGWRLQWKHVXEVHTXHQWFRXUWSURFHHGLQJVDVDQµindirect¶ RUµhands-RII¶UROH
in the abortion process. 7KHZRPHQVRXJKWMXGLFLDOUHYLHZRIWKHHPSOR\HU¶VGHFLVLRQBy the 
time the matter reached the courts, the disagreement between the parties had become focused 
on the question of whether or not the exemption in section 4(1) protected senior staff from 
having to XQGHUWDNHµdelegation, supervision DQGVXSSRUW¶ in relation to staff directly involved 
in the abortion process. The women argued that it did; their employer insisted that it did not. 
 
History 
The first court to review the decision of the Health Board was the Outer House of the Court 
of Session. There, it was argued for the PLGZLYHV WKDW µWUHDWPHQW¶ included µthe whole 
PHGLFDORUVXUJLFDOSURFHVV LQYROYHG LQ WHUPLQDWLRQ«7KHWUHDWPHQWDVDZKROHZDVD WHDP
effort and supervision was a necessary element of that effort.¶1 What this meant in terms of 
the scope of section 4(1) was that  
 
[on] a purposive and plain reading of the Act, s4(1) should be construed as covering 
the whole medical process resulting in termination and as embracing all of those who 
are part of the hospital team with responsibilities in relation to any part of the 
treatment.2 
 
                                                          
1
 CSIH, [12] 
2
 CSIH, [17] 
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On behalf of the Health Board it was argued that sections 1 and 4 ought to be treated as 
coextensive: only what was decriminalised by section 1 was µtreatment authorised by the Act¶ 
for the purposes of section 4(1). Conversely, anything which had been lawful prior to 1967 
and thus could not be said to have been µauthorised¶ µGHFULPLQDOLVHG¶by section 1 could not 
be regarded as falling within the scope of section 4. The Outer House accepted this argument, 
and found in favour of the employer.  
On appeal, the Inner House overturned the Outer House judgment, rejecting the 
µFRH[WHQVLYHness¶ DUJXPHQW and pointing out that the protection for individual practitioners 
afforded by section 4 was not granted on the basis of previous unlawfulness: 
 
The right in section 4 is given, not because the acts in question were previously, or 
may have been, illegal. The right is given because it is recognised that the process of 
abortion is felt by many people to be morally repugnant. As Lord Diplock observed in 
the RCN case, it is a matter on which many people have strong moral and religious 
convictions, and the right of conscientious objection is given out of respect for those 
convictions and not for any other reason. It is in keeping with the reason for the 
exemption that the wide interpretation which we favour should be given to it. It is 
consistent with the reasoning which allowed such an objection in the first place that it 
should extend to any involvement in the process of treatment, the object of which is to 
terminate a pregnancy.3 
 
In a commentary on the Inner House judgment,4  I argued that, although the Inner House was 
correct to identify the asymmetry of purpose between sections 1 and 4 as one of the reasons 
ZK\WKHµFRH[WHQVLYHness¶IRUPXODLVIDXOW\, asymmetry is only one of several reasons why 
the idea of µFRH[WHQVLYHQHVV¶LVSUREOHPDWLF. (I discussed the shortcomings of the idea fairly 
fully in the previous commentary, and I summarise them below.) 
The Supreme Court heard the oral argument in this case on 11th November 2014 and 
gave judgment on 17th December, allowing the appeal by the Health Board and setting aside 
the declarator of the Inner House. Baroness Hale of Richmond delivered the opinion of the 
Court and the other four justices (Lords Wilson, Reed, Hughes, and Hodge) agreed with her.  
                                                          
3
 CSIH, [38] 
4
 M Neal,  ‘Commentary  ? The Scope of the Conscience-Based Exemption in Section 4(1) of the Abortion Act 
1967: Doogan and Wood v NHS Greater Glasgow Health Board [2013] CSIH 36 ?(2014) 22 
Med. L. Rev. 409, 421 
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THE SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT 
 
The Supreme Court proceeded on the basis that µthe question in this case, and the only 
question, is the meaning of the words ³to participate in any treatment authorised by this Act 
to which he has a conscientious objection´.¶5 The Court decided that this question was to be 
determined µaccording to the ordinary principles of statutory construction¶.6 It explicitly 
declined to consider either Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (which 
protects the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion) or claims about the likely 
social consequences of adopting a wide or a narrow interpretation of the conscience right in 
section 4(1).7 Despite its obligation under section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to read 
legislation in a manner compatible with the European Convention, the Court decided that 
consideration of Article 9 would not be fruitful, since the question of compatibility was 
µcontext specific and would not necessarily point to either a wide or a narrow reading of 
section 4¶.8 Likewise, the Court decided that it was µnot equipped to gauge what effect either 
a wide or a narrow construction of the conscience clause would have upon the delivery of 
[abortion], which may well differ from place to place.¶9 Instead, it decided simply to follow 
µthe ordinary principles of statutory construction¶10 and µto PDNH WKH EHVW VHQVH«RI ZKDW
[section 4(1)] actually says.¶11 In the paragraphs that followed, the Court sought to establish 
the meanings of two key words, µtreatment¶ and µparticipation¶. 
7KH &RXUW DGGUHVVHG WKH PHDQLQJ RI µWUHDWPHQW¶ ILUVW Both sides accepted that the 
phrase µtreatment authorised by the Act¶ referred to a process, rather than to an isolated action 
or event. The Health Board had accepted as much even before the court proceedings began; 
their letter to the midwives informing of them of the outcome of the internal grievance 
procedure referred to µthe termination process¶.12 The insistence that treatment was both a 
µprocess¶ and a µteam effort¶ was also the central plank of the case for the midwives.13 The 
Supreme Court agreed that, following the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of 
Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security 
                                                          
5
 UKSC, [11] 
6
 UKSC, [24] 
7
 dŚĞƐĞǁĞƌĞĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚĂƐ ‘ƚǁŽĚŝƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƚƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚƐ ? ?-27. 
8
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9
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 CSIH, [6]  
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 CSIH, [12], [17], [18] 
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[1981] AC 800, treatment muVWEHXQGHUVWRRGDVDµSURFHVV¶VRWKDWµwhat is authorised by 
the Act is the whole course of medical treatment bringing about the ending of the 
pregnancy.¶14 
What the Court had to determine in this case were the parameters of this µWUHDWPHQW
SURFHVV¶ ZKHUH GLG WKH SURFHVV EHJLQ DQG ZKHUH GLG LW HQG" Lady Hale acknowledged a 
µspectrum of constructions¶15 of the treatment process, within which she identified four 
distinct and competing claims. At one end of the spectrum, according to Lady Hale, was the 
assertion by the Royal College of Midwives (RCM), in its intervention in this case, that  
 
µWKHWUHDWPHQWDXWKRULVHGE\WKLV$FW¶LVOLPLWHGWRthe treatment which actually causes 
the termination, that is, the administration of the drugs which induce premature 
labour. It does not extend to the care of the woman during labour, or to the delivery of 
the foetus, placenta and membrane, or to anything that happens after that.16 
 
Moving along the spectrum slightly, Lady Hale distinguished the foregoing view from the 
view the RCM KDGWDNHQLQLQDSRVLWLRQSDSHURQµFRQVFLHQWLRXVREMHFWLRQ¶. There, it 
had maintained that section 4(1) should be interpreted only as protecting staff against µdirect 
involvement in the procedure of terminating pregnancy¶.17 Lady Hale suggested that the 
5&0¶VYLHZLQµmay be a little narrower¶ than its 1997 position, presumably because 
the latter contemplates the exemption in the Act covering any involvement which is µdirect¶, 
whereas the upshot of the former is that however µdirect¶ involvement is, it would not be 
covered unless it µactually causes the termination¶.18 The 2014 view, according to Lady Hale, 
would mean that the only act from which practitioners would be able to exempt themselves 
for reasons of conscience would be the actual administration of the abortifacient drugs.19 
 A third construction was proposed by the Health Board, who claimed that the 
treatment process authorised by the 1967 Act µbegins with the administration of the drugs and 
HQGV ZLWK WKH µH[SXOVLRQ RI WKH SURGXFWV RI FRQFHSWLRQ ± foetus, placenta and membrane, 
IURPWKHZRPE¶¶20 According to this construction, the scope of section 4  
 
                                                          
14
 UKSC, [33], emphasis in original. 
15
 UKSC, [28] 
16
 UKSC, [29] 
17
 UKSC, [30], emphasis added 
18
 UKSC, [29], emphasis added. 
19
 UKSC, [29] 
20
 UKSC, [32] 
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does not cover making bookings or aftercare for patients. Nor does it cover fetching 
WKHGUXJEHIRUH LW LV DGPLQLVWHUHG«,WGRHVQRW FRYHU DGPLQLVWUDWLYH DQGPDQDJHULDO
tasks, such as allocating ward resources and assigning staff. Nor does it cover 
supervisory duties which are concerned with ensuring that general nursing care of an 
appropriate standard is provided to women undergoing a termination.21 
 
The fourth construction, argued for by the respondents (midwives), took the treatment 
process to include the whole process of termination and argued that section 4 entitled 
practitioners to be exempt from involvement in any part of it: 
 
[from] the initial telephone call booking the patient into the Labour Ward, to the 
admission of the patient, to assigning the midwife to look after the patient, to the 
supervision of the staff looking after the patient, both before and after the procedure, 
as well as to the direct provision of any care for those patients, apart from that which 
they are required to perform under section 4(2) [in emergencies].22 
 
As noted already, Lady Hale presented all of these alternatives as existing on a µspectrum¶ 
which ranged from the narrowest construction of the µtreatment process¶ (the position of the 
RCM in 2014) to the broadest (the UHVSRQGHQWV¶ interpretation). She regarded the construction 
proposed by the Health Board as being located somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, and 
endorsed it, elaborating: 
 
[Treatment] begins with the administration of the drugs designed to induce labour and 
normally ends with the ending of the pregnancy by delivery of the foetus, placenta 
and membrane. It would also, in my view, include the medical and nursing care which 
is connected with the process of undergoing labour and giving birth ± the monitoring 
of the progress of labour, the administration of pain relief, the giving of advice and 
VXSSRUWWRWKHSDWLHQWZKRLVJRLQJWKURXJKLWDOOWKHGHOLYHU\RIWKHIRHWXV«DQGWKH
disposal of the foetus, placenta and membrane.23 
 
                                                          
21
 UKSC, [32] 
22
 UKSC, [31] 
23
 UKSC, [34] 
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ThH VHFRQG VWDJH RI WKH &RXUW¶V VWDtutory interpretation exercise involved considering the 
meaning of µparticipation¶. Here, once again, Lady Hale sees the choice as being between 
µEURDG¶ DQG µQDUURZ¶ readings, although this time, instead of a spectrum of possible 
constructions, there are only two options: either µparticipation¶ is to be understood as µKDQGV-
RQ¶LQYROYHPHQW only, or it also covers LQYROYHPHQWWKDWLVPRUHLQGLUHFWRUµhands-RII¶ She 
decides, at paragraph 38: 
 
In my view the narrow meaning is more likely to have been in the contemplation of 
Parliament when the Act was passed. The focus of section 4 is on the acts made lawful 
by section 1.24 
 
Having agreed with the Health Board about the parameteUVRI WKH µWUHDWPHQWSURFHVV¶ DQG
GHWHUPLQHG WKDW µSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶ PHDQV KDQGV-on involvement, Lady Hale proceeds, in 
paragraph 39, to test WKHVH FRQFOXVLRQV µDJDLQVW WKH DJUHHG OLVW RI WDVNV LQFOXGHG LQ WKH
SHWLWLRQHUV¶UROHDV/DERXU:DUG&R-RUGLQDWRUV¶25 saying for each task whether it falls within 
or outside the scope of section 4(1) as she has interpreted it. By and large, tasks involving 
one-to-one contact or the exercise of clinical judgement are held to be covered, including: 
personally providing brHDNUHOLHIIRUPLGZLYHVRQGXW\µEHLQJSUHVHQWWRVXSSRUWDQGDVVLVWLI
PHGLFDOLQWHUYHQWLRQLVUHTXLUHG¶IRUPLQJDMXGJPHQWWKDWFDUHUHTXLUHVWREHHVFDODWHGWRD
PRUHVHQLRUVSHFLDOLVWOHYHODQGµGLUHFWO\SURYLGLQJFDUHLQHPHUJHQF\VLWXDWLRQV¶H[FHpt if 
covered by section 4(2)).26  
Tasks held not to be covered because they are considered to be µDGPLQLVWUDWLYH¶ RU
µPDQDJHULDO¶, include: µPDQDJHPHQWRIUHVRXUFHVZLWKLQWKH/DERXU:DUG¶LQFOXGLQJWDNLQJ
FDOOVWRDUUDQJHWHUPLQDWLRQVµSURYLGLQJDGHWDLOHGKDQGRYHU«WRWKHQHZ/DERXU:DUG&R-
RUGLQDWRU FRPLQJ RQ VKLIW¶ DOORFDWLQJ VWDII WR SDWLHQWV µSURYLGLQJ JXLGDQFH DGYLFH DQG
VXSSRUW¶WRPLGZLYHVRQGXW\H[FHSWZKHUHLWZRXOGEHµGLUHFWO\FRQQHFWHGZLWKWKHFDUHRID
particular patient undergoing a tHUPLQDWLRQ¶ µUHVSRQGLQJ WR UHTXHVWV IRU DVVLVWDQFH¶ IURP
                                                          
24
 Emphasis added. 
25
 UKSC, [39] 
26
 UKSC,  ? ? ? ? ?/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐůǇ ?>ĂĚǇ,ĂůĞ ?ƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŽŶůǇƚŚŽƐĞƚĂƐŬ ƚŚĂƚŝŶǀŽůǀĞĐůŝŶŝĐĂůũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚĂƌĞ
covered by section 4(1) appears to be at odds with the approach taken recently by Miola, who argues in this 
ũŽƵƌŶĂů ?ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ/ĂŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ between technical and non-technical decisions) that 
conscientious refusal can be appropriate only in relation to decisions that do not involve the exercise of clinical 
ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?:DŝŽůĂ ? ‘DĂŬŝŶŐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-making: conscience, regulation, anĚƚŚĞůĂǁ ? ?Medical 
Law Review (published online first, April 24, 2015)). The disagreement between Hale and these academic 
authorities is peripheral to my analysis, since I do not regard the distinction between tasks which do and do 
not involve clinical judgment as being the relevant one; nevertheless, it is interesting. 
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staff, and acting as their first point of contact in the event of any  concerns regarding patients 
(although the specific assistance which turns out to be required may be covered); organising 
break relief for staff (short of SURYLGLQJ WKDW UHOLHI SHUVRQDOO\ µFRPPXQLFDWLQJ ZLWK RWKHU
SURIHVVLRQDOV¶IRUH[DPSOHDFWLQJRQWKHMXGJPHQWRIWKHGXW\PLGZLIHWKDWDSDWLHQW¶VFDUH
needs to be escalated (forming the judgment oneself would be µLQYROYHPHQWLQWUHDWPHQW¶EXW
FRQWDFWLQJ DQ REVWHWULFLDQ DW WKH UHTXHVW RI WKH GXW\ PLGZLIH LV µD PDQDJHULDO WDVN¶ DQG
providing support to the family of a patient (Lady Hale considers this not to be covered by 
section 4(1), but GLVFXVVHVWKHµUHDVRQDEOHQHVV¶RIDFFRPPRGDWLQJHPSOR\HHV¶FRQVFLHQWLRXV
positions nevertheless, since staff who do not object to abortion may be able to provide the 
IDPLO\ZLWKDPRUHµHIIHFWLYHVHUYLFH¶27 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Statutory construction 
 
µTreatment¶ 
Although Lady Hale does not provide an explicit reason for favouring the construction of the 
µWUHDWPHQW SURFHVV¶ proposed by the Health Board, there is some evidence that her choice 
rests upon the questionable notion that sections 1 and 4 of the Act are coextensive such that 
section 4(1) entitles practitioners to opt out only of activity decriminalised by section 1. For 
exampleWKH&RXUW¶VSUHIHUUHGFRQVWUXFWLRQLVDQQRXQFHGLQSDUDJUDSKLQDPDQQHUZKLFK
seems to imply that it follows from the discussion in paragraph 33 (paragraph 34 begins: 
µThus ,DJUHHZLWKWKHDSSHOODQWV«¶28). The discussion in paragraph 33 had just attempted to 
shed light on the meaning of the phrase µtreatment authorised by this Act¶ in section 4 by 
reference to various aspects of section 1. Later, in paragraph 38, Lady Hale remarks that µthe 
focus of section 4 is on the acts made lawful by section 1¶. Again, this seems to imply that the 
µFRH[WHQVLYHness¶DSSURDFK, which persuaded the Outer House of the Court of Session at first 
instance, but which the Inner House rejected, is being resurrected to some degree in the 
6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VMXGJPHQW.  
In my commentary on the Inner House judgment, I acknowledged that the idea of 
symmetry between sections 1 and 4 has µa certain amount of superficial appeal¶.29 Given a 
                                                          
27
 UKSC, [39] 
28
 Emphasis added. 
29
 Neal, above n4, 415. 
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range of competing constructions of the µtreatment process¶ and no other obvious basis on 
which to choose between them, the suggestion that a neat formula is inherent in the statute 
itself must be very enticing indeed for the judge who believes she is faced with µa pure 
question of statutory construction¶.30 Unfortunately for Lady Hale, however, the formula is 
unsound. 
In my previous commentary I identified several reasons why it is a mistake to suppose 
that we can regard the scope of section 4 as neatly coextensive with the decriminalisation 
effected by section 1.31 It is (unfortunately) necessary to recap them again here, briefly. 
First, the law relating to abortion prior to 1967 seems to have been subtly different in 
Scotland than in England and Wales, and to have been clear in neither jurisdiction. Lady Hale 
herself acknowledges that the mischief the 1967 Act set out to address was µthe unsatisfactory 
and uncertain state of the previous law¶,32 and indeed the Act was, explicitly, µ[an] Act to 
amend and clarify the law relating to termination of pregnancy¶.33 This has three implications 
for the suggestion that sections 1 and 4 are coextensive. The first is a simple point: if the law 
was unclear before 1967, how can we be certain precisely what section 1 did decriminalise? 
If we cannot, but we insist nevertheless that section 4 covers only what was decriminalised by 
section 1, then it follows that we cannot know with any certainty what section 4 covers. The 
second implication is that if the law in Scotland was different from that in England and Wales 
prior to 1967, the decriminalising effect of section 1 must also have been different in each 
jurisdiction, which in turn means that, on DµFRH[WHQVLYHness¶DSSURDFKWKHVFRSHRIVHFWLRQ
must currently be different in Scotland than in England and Wales. It seems unlikely that 
Parliament would have intended such a difference.  (I explain this point more fully in my 
previous note,34 so will not elaborate here.) The final implication is that, insofar as 
clarification of the law was a purpose of the Act, it seems highly unlikely that Parliament 
would have intended for the scope of section 4 to be determined by indirect reference to the 
pre-1967 position. In setting out to clarify the law, Parliament acknowledged that the existing 
law was unclear, and it would be strange if, cognisant of this, Parliament decided to import 
WKHROGODZ¶VODFNRIFODULW\LQWRWKHEUDQGQHZVWDWXWRU\UHJLPHE\WKHEDFNGRRU 
7KH VHFRQG PDLQ SUREOHP ZLWK WKH µFRH[WHQVLYHness¶ DSSURDFK LV WKDW LW VHHPV
fundamentally to misunderstand the nature and purpose of a conscience clause. Conscience 
                                                          
30
 UKSC, [33] 
31
 Neal, above n4. 
32
 UKSC, [27] 
33
 Abortion Act 1967 (as enacted), emphasis added. 
34
 Neal, above n4, 415-416. 
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clauses exist primarily to protect people from moral responsibility for what they regard as 
wrongdoing; this, it seems to me, has little if anything to do with whether activity was 
SUHYLRXVO\ FULPLQDO $ KLJKOLJKW RI WKH ,QQHU +RXVH¶V MXGJPHQW LV LWV UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKLV
although it could perhaps have articulated the point more fully. I will return to the theme of 
moral responsibility later in this commentary, so will not dwell on it now save to 
acknowledge that there is simply no reason to suppose that the scope of a section designed to 
protect practitioners from involvement in moral wrongdoing ought to depend on what was 
previously criminal. Sections 1 and 4 are concerned with two distinct (albeit connected) kinds 
of normativity, and this asymmetry of purpose ought further to weaken the appeal of a 
µFRH[WHQVLYHness¶DSSURDFK.  
 Both of the problems I have identified so far are problems with trying to determine 
the scope of section 4(1) by reference to what section 1 decriminalised, not what it 
µauthorised¶ (which is the wording actually used in section 4(1)). The third main problem 
with coextensiveness is precisely this tendency to interpret the key phrase µtreatment 
authorised by this Act¶ in the very narrow sense of µbehaviour decriminalised by this Act¶.  
 
µAuthorised by this Act¶ 
It is surprising, given DOORIWKHIRFXVRQWKHSKUDVHµWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQDQ\WUHDWPHQWDXWKRULVHG
E\ WKLV $FW¶ DQG RQ WKH PHDQLQJV RI WKH ZRUGV µWUHDWPHQW¶ DQG µSDUWLFLSDWH¶ ZLWKLQ WKLV
phrase, that none of the three courts that have considered this case has given any explicit 
consideration to what µDXWKRULVHG¶ means in the context of section 4(1). The Outer House 
VLPSO\DVVXPHGWKDWµDXWKRULVHG¶PHDQWµGHFULPLQDOLVHG¶ 
 
The 1967 Act authorises, in certain defined circumstances, action in relation to a 
ZRPDQ¶VSUHJQDQF\ZKLFKZould, prior to its coming into force, have been an offence 
under the common law [in Scotland].35 
 
This assumption was never seriously questioned at any subsequent stage of the judicial 
review. The Inner House came closest to contemplating a fuller meaning fRU µDXWKRULVHG¶
VD\LQJµ,QRXUYLHZLWLVQRWRQO\WKHDFWXDOWHUPLQDWLRQZKLFKLVDXWKRULVHGE\WKH$FWIRU
the purposes of section 4(1), but any part of the treatment which was given for that end 
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SXUSRVH¶36 +RZHYHUWKH2XWHU+RXVH¶VFRQYLFWLRQWKDWµWKHNH\ZRUGVDUH³SDUWLFLSDWH´DQG
³WUHDWPHQW´¶37 together with its simple DVVXPSWLRQWKDWµDXWKRULVHG¶PHDQVµGHFULPLQDOLVHG¶
XOWLPDWHO\ VHW WKH SDWWHUQ IRU WKH KLJKHU FRXUWV¶ FRQVLGHUDWLRQ This is a pity: clearly, 
µDXWKRULVDWLRQ¶bears a wider interpretation WKDQPHUHµGHFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶ and there appears 
to be no sound basis for such a restricted understanding of the term.  
:KDW WKH $FW µDXWKRULVHG¶ , KDYH DUJXHG SUHYLRXVO\ ZDV WKH FUHDWLRQ RI D ZKROH
µtreatment context¶ for abortion: 
 
in decriminalising and medicalising termination, the Act did not simply authorise the 
central acts themselves; it authorised and indeed created a surrounding process ± a 
treatment context ± involving a team of healthcare workers with a variety of roles.38 
 
)RUWKLVUHDVRQLQP\YLHZWKHSKUDVHµWUHDWPHQWDXWKRULVHGE\WKLV$FW¶LVEHVWXQGHUVWRRG
as covering not only the narrow set of actions the Act decriminalised, but everything that the 
$FWDOORZHGIRURUHQDEOHGµWKHZKROHSURFHVVIRUZKLFKWKH$FWSURYLGHG¶39 This approach 
WR WKH PHDQLQJ RI µDXWKRULVHG¶ LV PRUH KDUPRQLRXV ZLWK WKH DFFHSWDQFH WKDW WUHDWPHQW LV D
process involving a team. To acknowledge the latter (as the Supreme Court does), yet 
simultaneously cling to the idea that the definition of treatment is somehow dependent on 
KLVWRULFDO GHFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ IHHOV OLNH D FRQWUDGLFWLRQ ,I µDXWKRULVH¶ LV JLYHQ WKHPHDQLQJ ,
have proposed, this tension is avoided.  
 2IFRXUVH KRZHYHU MXVWLILHGD&RXUWZRXOGEH LQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ µDXWKRULVHGE\ WKLV
AFW¶ LQ its fuller sense, understanding WKH $FW DV KDYLQJ µDXWKRULVHG¶ WKH ZKROH WUHDWPHQW
context does require us to address the possibility of over-breadth. If the µWUHDWPHQWDXWKRULVHG
E\WKLV$FW¶LVWKHZKROHRIDERUWLRQSURYLVLRQ, on what basis can we then deny the protection 
of section 4(1) to anyone associated with that provision, however remotely? I will return to 
this later, when discussing moral responsibility. 
 
 
µParticipate¶ 
In paragraph 38, the preference for the narrow, µKDQGV-RQ¶ PHDQLQJ RI µparticipate¶ is 
juxtaposed very directly with the idea that sections 1 and 4 are coextensive. For the reasons 
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set out above, that idea is problematic when it focuses on the decriminalising effect of section 
1, and this is clearly the case in paragraph 38, with its reference WRµDFWVPDGHODZIXO¶. Insofar 
DV/DG\+DOH¶VFRQFOXVLRQWKDWµparticipate¶ means µtaking part in a ³hands-on´ capacity¶40 is 
influenced by this idea, the conclusion must also be problematic. But she also says, in a 
crucial passage: 
 
It is unlikely that, in enacting the conscience clause, Parliament had in mind the host 
of ancillary, administrative and managerial tasks that might be associated with [the 
acts made lawful by section 1]. Parliament will not have had in mind the hospital 
managers who decide to offer an abortion service, the administrators who decide how 
EHVWWKDWVHUYLFHFDQEHRUJDQLVHGZLWKLQWKHKRVSLWDO«WKHFDWHUHUVZKRSURYLGHWKH
patients with food, and the cleaners who provide them with a safe and hygienic 
environment. Yet all may be said in some way to be facilitating the carrying out of the 
treatment involved.41 
 
In my commentary on the Inner House decision, I argued just the opposite: that the purpose 
of Parliament in enacting the 1967 Act 
 
was to ensure that terminations of pregnancy would, thereafter, be carried out within a 
highly-organised clinical context full of reporting structures, job descriptions, 
professional bodies, codes of ethics, and so on. As such, the Act deliberately brought 
a range of new people (and their consciences) into contact with the abortion process.42 
 
I continued, 
 
Parliament would have been well aware of the fact that the Act [would] provide for a 
medical context within which lawful termination could take place, and that this 
context would necessarily involve a range of other employees besides the clinician 
immediately responsible for destroying the foetus.43 
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In my view, the claim that these other employees must have been beyond the contemplation 
of a Parliament enacting a statute to provide for the provision of abortion as µtreatment¶ is 
VLPSO\XQFRQYLQFLQJ/DG\+DOH¶VRZQDFNQRZOHGJPHQWWKDWµthe policy behind the Act was 
DOVRWRSURYLGHVXFKDVHUYLFHZLWKLQWKH1DWLRQDO+HDOWK6HUYLFH«¶44 makes her subsequent 
denial that Parliament could have had the members of a healthcare team in an NHS hospital 
in mind when legislating all the more improbable. Thus, whether the preference for DµKDQGV-
RQ¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµSDUWLFLSDWH¶LVgrounded  in a belief in the coextensiveness of sections 1 
and 4, or in a narrow view of who Parliament must have had in mind, or in both, it is faulty.  
 TKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VDSSURDFKWRWKHPHDQLQJVRIµWUHDWPHQW¶DQGµSDUWLFLSDWH¶ODFNV
D VRXQG UDWLRQDOH ,Q HDFK FDVH WKH FRXUW¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ VHHPV WR EH LQIOXHQFHG E\ WKH
assumption that sections 4 and 1 are coextensive in the specific sense that section 4 protects 
practitioners only from activity which is decriminalised by section 1. In the case of 
µSDUWLFLSDWH¶ /DG\ +DOH¶V SUREOHPDWLF DVVHUWLRQ WKDW 3DUOLDPHQW VLPSO\ FRXOG QRW KDYH
intended section 4 to protect any employees other than those who would otherwise be 
involved in the direct act of termination in D µhands-RQ¶ FDSDFLW\ ought to cast additional 
doubt on her conclusion.  
  
µ0RUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶YHUVXVa binary approach 
 
At every stage of the Doogan litigation, the courts understood the choice before them as 
EHLQJ EHWZHHQ µEURDGZLGH¶ DQG µQDUURZ¶ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV RI VHFWLRQ  ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQV
ZKLFKXQGHUVWRRG WKHSURYLVLRQDVFRYHULQJ LQGLUHFWRU µhands-RII¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQDERUWLRQ
were characteULVHG DV µZLGH¶ DQG WKRVH ZKLFK UHVWULFWHG SURWHFWLRQ WR GLUHFW RU µhands-RQ¶
LQYROYHPHQW ZHUH FKDUDFWHULVHG DV µQDUURZ¶ <HW WR DSSURDFK WKH VFRSH RI D FRQVFLHQFH
provision in terms of simplistic binaries ʊ VXFK DV µhands-RQ¶µhands-RII¶ GLUHFWLQGLUHFW, 
and broad/narrow ʊ is to pay insufficient attention to the main purpose of such provisions. 
Whatever other purpose a conscience provision may serve (as part of a political compromise, 
for example), its most direct and explicit purpose is to protect individuals from sharing in 
moral responsibility for what they perceive as wrongdoing. Unless it is interpreted in a way 
that achieves this, its purpose is frustrated. 
 Rather than asking whether the provision should be interpreted broadly or narrowly, 
then, the appropriate question is whether the action from which the individual seeks to be 
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exempt would render her morally responsible for the outcome she perceives as immoral. In 
considering the scope of section 4(1) specifically, the appropriate question to ask is whether a 
midwife doing what these midwives seek not to do would share in any moral responsibility 
EODPH RU FUHGLW GHSHQGLQJ XSRQ RQH¶V YLHZ IRU WKH DERUWLRQ ,I WKH WDVN UHQGHUV WKH
practitioner morally complicit in the outcome, it must be covered, regardless of whether it is 
µhands-RII¶, or was lawful prior to 1967; if it does not render her morally responsible, she can 
be expected to undertake it, even if it involves direct, one-to-one contact with patients 
undergoing terminations. 
 In contexts where most of us are agreed about the immorality of the activity in 
question, it is by no means accepted WKDW µPHUH¶ LQGLUHFWµhands-RII¶DGPLQLVWUDWLYH
involvement avoids moral responsibility. At the time of writing, a German court is 
considering whether an elderly man who worked as an administrator at Auschwitz during the 
Holocaust bears any criminal responsibility for the mass murder perpetrated there. The man, 
93-year-old Oskar Gröning, argues that since he did not participate directly in the murder of 
prisoners, he is not criminally responsible; interestingly, however, he accepts that, because he 
worked at the camp willingly, he deserves a share of the moral guilt for what went on.45 The 
DGPLQLVWUDWLYH LQGLUHFW µhands-RII¶ QDWXUH RI KLV SDUWLFLSDWLRQ GRHV QRW LQ KLV RZQ YLHZ
exclude moral responsibility, and the forgiveness bestowed on Gröning by Eva Kor, one of 
the Holocaust survivors who has testified against him, presupposes agreement with GröQLQJ¶V
own assessment that he bears moral guilt (since forgiveness would otherwise be 
inappropriate).46 To be clear, the point here is not to assert any moral equivalence between 
abortion and Nazi atrocities; it is rather that when the immorality of a project is widely 
acknowledged, those performing hands-off, administrative roles can plausibly be regarded as 
morally blameworthy (and may regard themselves as such).  
 In general, approaching the scope of a conscience-based exemption by acknowledging 
the nature and purpose of such provisions must be preferable to approaching it in a way that 
ignores them; and when the issue is viewed through the lens of moral responsibility it is 
immediately apparent that someone who authorises a process (for example, the general 
practitioner who signs the form) has moral responsibility for it, as do those who support the 
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process by arranging practicalities, allocating tasks, and supervising those directly involved. 
Viewed through this lens, tKHSKUDVH µGHOHJDWLRQ VXSHUYLVLRQDQG VXSSRUW¶ ZKLFKFDPH WR
sum up the role of Labour Ward Co-ordinator in this case) clearly describes a role which is 
not morally-neutral, but rather involves actively supporting the abortion process.  
 It is necessary, however, to address the question of over-breadth: this litigation is, 
after all, about the scope of the section, i.e. its limits. If we begin, as I have claimed we must, 
from the premise that the direct purpose of section 4(1) is to enable practitioners to avoid 
moral responsibility ² and if we reject the notion that the scope of section 4 can be 
determined by reading it as coextensive with section 1 ² what limits can we recognise, apart 
from the statutory limit in section 4(2))? 
 Lady Hale cited the roles of hospital caterers and cleaners as clear examples of roles 
not covered by the exemptionDOEHLWWKDWWKRVHZKRSHUIRUPWKHVHUROHVµPD\EHVDLGLQVRPH
way to be IDFLOLWDWLQJWKHWUHDWPHQWLQYROYHG¶.47 Section 4(1) UHIHUVVSHFLILFDOO\WRµWUHDWPHQW¶
and it would be difficult to construe FDWHULQJDQGFOHDQLQJDVµWUHDWPHQW¶HYHQLQWKHZLGHVW
sense (since the non-artificial supply of food and the provision of cleaning services are not 
FKDUDFWHULVHG DV µWUHDWPHQW¶ LQ DQ\ RWKHU FRQWH[W 6R, contra Lady Hale, who regards the 
roles as similar for the purposes of the Act, it seems perfectly straightforward to differentiate 
between the contributions of caterers and cleaners who are clearly not involved in 
µWUHDWPHQW¶and midwives, who are healthcare professionals and part of the team carrying out 
a treatment process.  
 %XWWKHTXHVWLRQ,PXVWFRQVLGHULVZKHWKHUWKHµPRUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶DSSURDFK,DP
proposing allows us to distinguish between the two. I suggest that it does. It might be 
tempting to try to distinguish the contribution of caterers and cleaners to the abortion process 
on the basis that when they provide food or clean areas of the hospital, only a small part of 
what they do contributes to the abortion process; much of the food they provide is consumed 
by other patients, and the areas they clean are used for other purposes besides abortion. 
Individual staff members who cook and clean may even be unaware that they are cogs in the 
abortion process at all.  But I believe this is the wrong type of argument, and that even if a 
caterer knowingly provides food only to abortion patients, or a cleaner knowingly cleans only 
wards used exclusively for abortions, he or she cannot be acting immorally even if abortion is 
immoral. Sara Fovargue and I have recently observed that genuinely-held conscientious 
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SRVLWLRQV DUH HPEUDFHG µRQ WKH EDVLV WKDW >WKH\ DUH@ EHOLHYHG WR EH LQ DFFRUGDQFH with the 
UHTXLUHPHQWV RI HWKLFV¶48 and that µ>L@QVRIDU DV FRQVFLHQWLRXV SRVLWLRQV DUH µHWKLFDO¶ in 
this«sense, it seems impossible to acknowledge as truly conscientious any position which 
IDLOV WR PHHW EDVLF HWKLFDO UHTXLUHPHQWV¶.49 We have argued that µ[t]he duty to behave 
respectfully toward others is a general (arguably the most JHQHUDOHWKLFDOGXW\¶50 and further, 
that 
 
 µD JHQXLQHO\ HWKLFDO SRVLWLRQ FDQQRW HQWDLO D ODFN RI FRPSDVVLRQ RU FDUH *RRG
 conscience never demands that a HCP avoid feeding, toileting, comforting, listening, 
 and other basic acts of care. Even if I regard the treatment a patient is receiving as 
 immoral, it cannot be immoral for me to dry her tears if she is distressed, fetch her a 
 glass of water if she is thirsty, or adjust her pillows if she is uncomfortable. It would 
 be immoral not WRGRWKHVHWKLQJV¶51 
 
Providing basic human needs like nutrition and hygiene is a moral duty; it can never be a 
moral duty to withhold them. The necessarily ethical character of conscientious positions, 
UDWKHUWKDQDQ\VLPSOLVWLFGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQEURDGQDUURZRUµhands-RQ¶µhands-RII¶RUDQ\
FRH[WHQVLYHQHVVEHWZHHQVHFWLRQVDQGLVZK\EDVLFHWKLFDOGXWLHVVXFKDVµUHVSRQGLQJWR
UHTXHVWVIRUDVVLVWDQFH¶DUHQRWFRYHUHG by section 4(1), and nor are drying tears, making cups 
of tea, listening, toileting, feeding, and so on: there cannot be a moral obligation not to care. 
Conscientious positions are delimited by their character as ethical positions; it would be 
counter-intXLWLYHWRLQWHUSUHWWKHPVRDVWRµH[HPSW¶LQGLYLGXDOVIURPEDVLFHWKLFDOGXWLHVDQG
simple acts of humanity to vulnerable others. We may disagree vigorously about the morality 
of abortion, but there is no room for disagreement about the everyday duties of respect and 
care we owe to one another. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJ WKDW WKLV MXGJPHQW¶V UDWLRQDOH DSSHDUV WR OLH LQ VRPH FRPELQDWLRQ RI WKH
ideas of (i) FRH[WHQVLYHQHVVEHWZHHQVHFWLRQVDQGDQGLLWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµKDQGV-
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RQ¶µhands-RII¶participation, it is far from clear that either idea is actually decisive in Lady 
+DOH¶VDQDO\VLVRIZKDWLVDQGLVQRWFRYHUHGE\VHFWLRQµ*XLGDQFHDGYLFHDQGVXSSRUW¶
LVDFNQRZOHGJHGWREHFRYHUHGLILWLVµGLUHFWO\FRQQHFWHGZLWKWKHFDUHRIDSDrticular patient 
XQGHUJRLQJDWHUPLQDWLRQ¶52 QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKDW LW LVµhands-RII¶ LQYROYHPHQW&RQYHUVHO\
µUHVSRQGLQJWRUHTXHVWVIRUDVVLVWDQFHLQFOXGLQJUHVSRQGLQJWRWKHQXUVHFDOOV\VWHPDQGWKH
HPHUJHQF\SXOO¶ LV QRW FRYHUHG per se, although it involves direct, one-to-one contact with 
patients undergoing terminations.53 $VIRUFRH[WHQVLYHQHVV/DG\+DOHOLVWVDVµQRWFRYHUHG¶
several tasks which amount to arranging DERUWLRQ LQFOXGLQJ µWDNLQJ WHOHSKRQH FDOOV«WR
arrange medical terminations of pregnDQF\¶54 managing resources,55 and allocating staff to 
patients.56 She also agrees with Lord Keith in R v Salford Health Authority, ex parte Janaway 
[1989] AC 537 that a GP who signs a certificate to the effect that a woman satisfies the 
statutory grounds for abortion is not involved in the µtreatment process¶ VLQFH µWUHDWPHQW¶
cannot commence until after such certification has taken place) and so is not covered by 
section 4(1).57  
 These findings seem at odds with a µFRH[WHQVLYHnessGHFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶ DSSURDFK: 
arranging and facilitating abortion would have been unlawful prior to 1967, amounting to 
µFRQVSLUDF\ WRSURFXUHDERUWLRQ¶58 so tasks which amount to arranging/facilitating abortion 
nowadays ought to be covered by the section 4(1) exemption if a coextensiveness test is 
EHLQJDSSOLHGFRQVLVWHQWO\%XWQRWRQO\DUHFRH[WHQVLYHQHVVDQG WKHµhands-RQ¶µhands-RII¶
distinction not actually GHFLVLYH LQ /DG\ +DOH¶V VFKHPH , FRQWHQG WKDW QHLWKHU can validly 
determine the scope of a conscience provision such as that in section 4(1), precisely because 
such tests fail to capture the essence of conscience provisions: a concern with moral 
responsibility.  
 7KHIDFWWKDWIRXUFRPSHWLQJGHILQLWLRQVRIWKHµWUHDWPHQWSURFHVV¶H[LVWHGDQGKDGWR
be considered by the Court demonstrates that, prior to this case, the scope of the exemption in 
section 4(1) was anything but clear. This undermines any suggestion that Lady +DOH¶V
judgment simply confirms what the vast majority of stakeholders have always understood the 
scope of section 4(1) to be. If there was any such widespread understanding, it did not 
                                                          
52
 UKSC, [39], item (4) 
53
 UKSC, [39], item (6). The particular assistance requested may ďĞĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝĨŝƚĨŽƌŵƐ ‘ƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ
ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚĨŽƌĂƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
54
 UKSC, [39], item (1) 
55
 UKSC, [39], item (1) 
56
 UKSC, [39], item (3) 
57
 UKSC, [36] 
58
 This offence was indicted and convicted in R v Whitchurch (Thomas William) and Others (1890) L.R. 24 Q.B.D. 
420; the English common law of conspiracy was much wider in the pre-1967 Act era. 
18 
 
encompass major players such as the Royal College of Midwives, since neither RIWKH5&0¶V
constructions of the treatment process was adopted by the Court.  
 Following the Inner House judgment, it seemed that the lower court had left scope for 
WKHMXGJPHQWRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWWRµDGGYDOXH¶59 Instead, the highest court relied upon a 
simplistic formula which rightly found no favour in the Inner House and which collapses 
under scrutiny. 3HUKDSVWKHPRVWUHPDUNDEOHWKLQJRIDOODERXW/DG\+DOH¶VMXGJPHQWLVWKDW
all of her colleagues were persuaded to join her in it, despite its shortcomings. 
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